In this blog post I explore the complicated dynamics surrounding the construction of the ‘cultural front’ in Putin’s Russia. Recently I participated in a conference, where I presented some results of my research into the changes in cultural legislation over the past year. My case study sheds light on the use of cultural policy to shape a national cultural front and promote the Kremlin’s stance on the so-called ‘special operation in Ukraine’. In this post, I will summarise the key findings of my research and provide insights into the characteristics and implications of this cultural front.
Research questions and methodology:
In my study, I sought to answer two primary research questions: How does the Russian establishment use cultural policy to create a national cultural front aligned with the Kremlin’s goals? And what are the characteristics of this cultural front? To answer these questions, I conducted an analysis of recent parliamentary debates1,2, amendments to cultural legislation3, and two normative acts focusing on the protection of Russia’s traditional values4 and the projection of Russian humanitarian policy abroad5. To analyse the data, I applied methods associated with Laclau and Mouffe’s post-structuralist discourse theory, exploring the key meanings, problems, proposed solutions, and subject positions formed within the cultural policy discourse.
Key findings:
The results of my research show that in the past year, cultural policy has assimilated mainstream concepts propagated through media propaganda. Concepts such as the Russian World, cultural sovereignty and traditional values have become central ‘nodal points’ within both domestic and foreign cultural legislation. The Russian World represents the cultural, spiritual and territorial integrity of the Russian-speaking population in opposition to the Western world. It is closely linked to the notion of Russian cultural sovereignty, which emphasises the importance of traditional and spiritual values in preserving Russia’s cultural integrity. These narratives are constructed within the framework of Russia-West antagonism, highlighting social disintegration, the rise of liberalism, consumerism and European spiritual degradation as central problems in Russian society. (Slide 3)
Financial mechanisms and implementation:
Amendments to federal legislation have introduced more flexible and less bureaucratic instruments, facilitating the allocation of funds to loyal cultural producers and bottom-up ‘patriotic initiatives’. While these changes have not significantly improved state subsidies and procurement for cultural heritage and art institutions, they have effectively served the Kremlin’s rule. Two new foundations, the Presidential Fund for Culture and the Russian Cultural Foundation, have emerged as the main parallel mechanisms for funding activities focused on patriotic education and national unity. These foundations play a crucial role in funding initiatives that conform to the official narrative of defending Russia’s truth and cultural sovereignty against Western aggression (see: Meduza 2022). However, they also represent a concentration of power within the presidential administration and reflect a neoliberal character in Putin’s governance, as cultural production increasingly relies on short-term and project-based funding. (Slide 4)
Coercive measures and social division:
In addition to positive measures to build a cultural front, the authoritarian Russian regime has introduced restrictive legislation on ‘fake news’ and ‘discrediting the Russian army’, creating an environment of fear and self-censorship. Anti-war protesters have been arrested and fined, with cases of imprisonment for seemingly innocuous acts of dissent. These measures indicate a visible attempt to transform the authoritarian regime into a more totalitarian one, using cultural policy to mobilise the masses, control cultural participation and exert symbolic pressure. Russian society appears to be divided into two camps: the empowered subjects of the Russian world and those marginalised or dehumanised by the official narrative. Dissenting voices or those who question the special operation are labelled as traitors, brainwashed, insufficiently patriotic, or dangerous liberals. The scale of arrests and fines faced by anti-war protesters, as documented by the independent human rights and media group OVD-Info, highlights the visible attempt to transform the authoritarian Russian regime into a more totalitarian one.
Cultural policy as a Kremlin’s took of social division:
Within the official effort to create a strong cultural front, Russian society seems to be divided into two camps. On one side are the legitimate and empowered subjects of the Russian world, while on the other are those marginalised or dehumanised by the official narrative. Those who dare to question the aims or means of the special operation are branded as traitors, brainwashed by the West, and insufficiently patriotic or dangerous liberals. For instance, a week ago Russian theatre director Yevgenia Berkovich and playwright Svetlana Petriychuk were arrested because their play ‘contains the destructive ideology of feminism’ (Novaya Gazeta Europe 2023). In other words, critical thought and art, an active social position, is enough to qualify as dissent and to be eliminated as a dangerous element for social conformism and unity.
Conclusive remarks:
It is important to note, however, that the totalisation of Russian society is not yet complete. While visible conformist rituals dominate media coverage, my previous research (Romashko 2023) has uncovered glimpses of subversive cultural politics. These manifestations challenge the hegemonic narratives surrounding the Russian president, the invasion of Ukraine, its aftermath and public support. Such acts of anti-war dissent shed light on the underground but vibrant political life within marginalised populations, reflecting an ongoing struggle against the dominant narrative.
The labelling of Russia as a fascist or totalitarian state is a matter of debate among scholars (Snyder 2022; Marlene 2022), but does not provide any significant analytical novelty. To truly understand the situation in Russia, it is imperative to dig deeper and conduct micro-analyses of events that remain hidden from mainstream media coverage. Attention should be paid to the underground and semiotically coded cases of cultural subversion that offer insights into the ongoing resistance to Putin’s regime.
Moving forward:
It is crucial to consider ways in which we can support those fighting the regime from within. By focusing on the nuanced dynamics and voices of dissent that often go unnoticed, we can contribute to a fuller understanding of the complex realities in Russia. It is through this lens that we can effectively challenge and address the problems arising from the use of cultural policy to serve the authoritarian regime and consolidate societal loyalty under the banner of the ‘cultural front’.
References
Marlene, L. 2022. So, Is Russia Fascist Now? Labels and Policy Implications, The Washington Quarterly, 45:2, 149-168.
Meduza. 2022. ‘Help with self-identification’ A Russian presidential fund is handing out millions to projects supporting the war in Ukraine, September 10, https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/10/russian-authorities-will-finance-an-exhibit-about-russian-feats-in-ukraine-and-a-fantasy-collection-about-the-donbas
Novaya Gazeta Europe. 2023. Russian theatre director Evgenia Berkovich and playwright Svetlana Petriychuk sent to pre-trial jail for two months, charged with ‘justifying terrorism’, 5 May 2023 https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/05/05/russian-theatre-director-evgenia-berkovich-sent-to-pre-trial-jail-for-two-months-charged-with-justifying-terrorism-en-news
Romashko, T. (2023) Peace and War in Our Bodies and Minds: Public Subversion versus Mass Totalization. Visual Anthropology. Ahead of Print. DOI: 10.1080/08949468.2023.2210031
Snyder, Timothy. 2022. “We Should Say It. Russia Is Fascist.” New York Times, May 19. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/19/opinion/russia-fascism-ukraine-putin.html